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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1988).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A.

Under Utah Code Ann. S 10-2-424 (1986), is UP&L

entitled to reimbursement for all facilities dedicated to serving
the annexed areas?
1.

Were UP&L's substation and generation facilities

"dedicated" to providing utility service to the annexed
areas?
2.

What is the appropriate measure of value of UP&L's

substation and generation facilities under Section 10-2-424,
and does it include going concern value and the value of
UP&L's franchise to serve the annexed areas?
B.

If UP&L is not entitled, under Section 10-2-424, to

compensation for its substation and generation facilities, plus
going concern value and the value of its franchise, is the statute unconstitutional, on its face or as applied by the District
Court, under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, or Article 1, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution?
C.

Is Logan entitled to acquire ownership of UP&Lfs

local distribution facilities under Section 10-2-424 upon payment

-1-

of the fair market value of such facilities as determined by the
district court?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
U.S. Const, amend, V:
No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, S 1;
. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
Utah Const, art. I, § 22s
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-424;
Whenever the electric consumers of the area being
annexed are receiving electric utility services from sources
other than the annexing municipality, the municipality may
not, without the consent of the electric utility, furnish
its electric utility services to the electric consumers
until the municipality has reimbursed the electric utility
company which previously provided the services for the fair
market value of those facilities dedicated to provide service to the annexed area. If the annexing municipality and
the electric utility cannot agree on the fair market value,
it shall be determined by the state court having
jurisdiction.

-2-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature Of The Case, Course Of The Proceedings And The
Disposition Below
This appeal involves efforts by Logan City to replace

Utah Power and Light Company ("UP&L") as the supplier of electric
utility service to several areas recently annexed by Logan,
Those annexed areas have historically been within UP&L's service
territory.
At issue is the amount of compensation due UP&L under
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-424 ("Section 424") and whether that statute permits Logan to acquire ownership of UP&L's facilities in
the annexed areas.
Logan commenced this action to enjoin UP&L from providing electric utility service within Logan's boundaries. R. 1-13.
The initial focus of Logan's complaint was UP&L's service to Utah
State University, an issue not implicated in this appeal.
UP&L counter-claimed and raised the issue of Section
424 and Logan's efforts to replace UP&L in the annexed areas.
R. 172-192. That portion of the case was governed by a stipulated Pre-trial Order (R. 480-94), which established the following issues, among others:
1.

Were UP&L's generation and substation facilities "dedicated" to the annexed areas under Section 424?

-3-

2.

Was UP&L entitled to reimbursement for substation and
generation facilities serving the annexed areas upon
Logan's talcing over service to those areas?

3.

What was the appropriate measure of valuation of UP&Lfs
facilities?

4.

Was UP&L entitled to going concern value and the value
of its franchise?

5.

If UP&L was not entitled to such reimbursement under
Section 424, was it entitled to compensation for the
value of its distribution facilities, going concern
value and severance damages under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.SC Constitution and Art, 1,
Section 22 of the Utah Constitution?

6.

Was Logan entitled to acquire ownership of UP&Lfs local
distribution facilities under Section 424?
During a hearing on August 3, 1988, UP&L presented evi-

dence, largely undisputed, of the value of its facilities, the
degrees to which they were dedicated to the annexed areas and the
damage UP&L would sustain in losing the annexed customers.

On

August 9, 1988, the district court issued a three page memorandum
decision holding that UP&L was entitled to be compensated only
for local distribution facilities, which had a stipulated value

-4-

of $117,000.

R. 495 - 98. The decision also held that UP&L was

not entitled to any compensation for substation or generating
facilities, going concern value, the value of its franchise or
severance damages.

Id.

On October 24, 1988, the district court entered, over
UP&Lfs objections (R. 499 - 508), Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Final Judgment (R. 540 - 47) which ordered
UP&L, upon Logan's payment of the $117,000, to transfer the
annexed customers to Logan, and to deliver possession of the
local distribution facilities to Logan.

UP&L sought a stay of

the judgment from the district court pending this appeal, but was
refused.

R. 563.

The $117,000 was paid into court and UP&L

transferred the customers and local facilities to Logan.
2.

R. 562.

Statement Of Facts
The facts in this case are largely undisputed.

Many

can be determined with reference to the Pre-trial Order (R.
480-94) and UP&Lfs Trial Brief (R. 429-475).

(Pursuant to Para-

graph V.C of the Pre-trial Order (R. 485), Logan accepted as
undisputed the fair market values UP&L assigned in its Trial
Brief to its substations and generation facilities).

The remain-

ing facts were established during the evidentiary hearing held on
August 3, 1985.

The citations in this brief to "Tr,f refer to the

transcript of that hearing.
-5-

UP&L, an investor owned utility company, has been supplying electricity to the unincorporated areas surrounding Logan
for over 70 years.

Tr. 15. At all times relevant to this case

it held a Franchise from Cache County and a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity from the Public Service Commission granting
to it the right and imposing upon it the obligation to supply
electricity to the inhabitants of Cache County until the year
2016.

R. 485, 492-94.

(The Franchise and Certificate were

exhibits to the Pre-trial Order and are attached hereto as Appendices A and B, respectively).

Until the trial court ordered UP&L

to transfer service to Logan, UP&L had been serving the annexed
areas under that Franchise and Certificate.
The annexed areas and customer locations appear on the
map attached to the Pre-trial Order as Exhibit "A"; fifty-five
commercial and residential customers are included.

R. 484, 491.

The map also depicts UP&Lfs local distribution facilities, i.e.,
the poles, lines, transformers, etc., used in delivering electricity to the annexed areas.

Id.

Some of those distribution facilities (the "exclusively
dedicated" distribution facilities) were used exclusively to
serve the annexed areas, whereas others (the "partially dedicated" distribution facilities) were used partly to serve the
annexed areas and partly to serve areas remaining outside Logan.
-6-

Id.

The Pre-trial Order established 1) that the partially dedi-

cated and exclusively dedicated distribution facilities were
"dedicated" under Section 424, and 2) the combined fair market
value of those facilities under Section 424 (including the proportional value of the partially dedicated distribution facilities) was $117,000.-/ R. 484-85.
UP&L supplied electricity to the annexed areas with an
integrated network of facilities; this network extended far
beyond the poles, lines and other distribution facilities located
in the annexed areas. Tr. 16 - 17, 41 - 44. The principal components of this extended network, for purposes of this case, were
UP&Lfs state-wide generating facilities, and its three substations (Millville, North Logan and Nibley) located nearby the
2/
annexed areas.-

It was undisputed that .009% of UP&Lfs state-

wide generating capacity was employed in producing electricity
for the annexed areas.

R. 485; Tr. 44; Ex. D-l.

It was also

undisputed that UP&L employed the three nearby substations in

This figure assumed that UP&L would keep the partially dedicated distribution facilities in Areas B, C and E of the
map, and it included any re-routing costs UP&L might incur
in continuing to operate its remaining distribution facilities. R. 485
UP&L did not claim compensation for its high voltage transmission facilities because they will wheel, at compensatory
rates, the annexed areas' electricity even if Logan is the
supplier. Tr. p. 16 1. 8 - 23.
-7-

order to reduce electricity from transmission level voltage to
voltage levels that could be distributed to the annexed areas.
R. 485; Tr. 16 - 17, 19 - 20, 24; Ex. D-l.
The generally accepted meaning of the term "dedicated",
as used in the electric utility industry, was not disputed.

Syn-

onymous to the regulatory concept of "used and useful", it encompasses all facilities directly employed in producing and delivering electricity to the ultimate consumer.

Tr. 40. Even Logan's

expert conceded that UP&Lfs substations and generation facilities
were "dedicated" to the extent UP&L used them to supply electricity to the annexed areas.

Tr. 90 - 92.

The values of UP&L's generation, substation, distribution facilities, based upon reproduction cost less depreciation,
and allocated according to the percentages to which the facilities were dedicated to the annexed areas, were not disputed by
Logan.

Those values were:

-8-

Facility

Reproduction
Cost Less
Depreciation of
Dedicated Portion

% Dedicated

Generation
Substation
Millville
North Logan
Nibley
Distribution
Excl. Ded.
Part, Ded.
Area A
Area B
Area C
Area E

$211,094
12,737

.009
3.25
3.04
.12

$117,000
100
32.77
12.12
6.45
12.12
$340,831

Tr. 44; Ex. D-l.
UP&L also presented evidence of the added value
attributable to the above facilities because they constituted a
"going concern".

This going concern value was expressed as the

present value of the net profits the dedicated facilities would
generate over time as a result of being engaged in business in
the annexed areas. Tr. 44 - 52; Ex. D-l.

This added value was

$94,156, resulting in a total fair market value for the dedicated
facilities of $434,987.

Id.;

Ex. D-9.

Logan presented no evi-

dence to rebut UP&Lfs claim for going concern value.
Finally, UP&L presented evidence of the damage to its
substations and generation facilities that would result from the
severance of the annexed areas from its system.

-9-

Tr. 5 7 - 6 1 .

Severance damages were presented as an alternative to computing
the fair market value of the substations and generation facilities under Section 424.

Id.

According to UP&L's unrebutted evi-

dence, the proper measure of severance damages was "incurred
unavoidable costs", i.e., the costs attributable to the dedicated
facilities that UP&L would continue to incur and could not avoid
either by idling the facilities or returning them to service
elsewhere in the system.

Id.

Those costs included capital car-

rying costs, interest on plant investment, taxes, insurance and
maintenance; they totalled $5,405 for substation and $127,007 for
generation.

Tr. 60.

When added to going concern value ($94,156)

and the value of the local distribution facilities ($117,000),
the resulting alternative compensation figure was $343,568.
Ex. D-10.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Utah Legislature enacted Section 424 to protect
public utilities and their ratepayers when municipal electrical
systems expand into annexed areas previously served by public
utilities.

The statute requires the municipality to compensate

the utility for all facilities "dedicated to provide service to
the annexed area."

The trade usage of "dedicated," which con-

trols the statutory interpretation, covers all property, wherever
located, to the extent used to provide service to the annexed
-10-

area.

Further, the legislative history shows that the Legisla-

ture was primarily concerned with protecting the remaining
ratepayers of the public utility, and insuring that they not be
saddled with costs of facilities made less useful by municipal
expansion.

Section 424 requires Logan to compensate UP&L for all

of UP&L's facilities, wherever located, to the extent they were
used to serve the annexed areas.

Any other interpretation of the

statute is contrary to the statutory language and the legislative
history, and places an unfair burden on UP&L and its ratepayers.
The district court's erroneous interpretation of Section 424 violated UP&L's constitutional right to just compensation for property damaged or taken.

At the very least, UP&L is

constitutionally entitled to be compensated for the value of its
expropriated business, including going concern value and the
value of its franchise, plus severance damage to its remaining
facilities.
Finally, the district court erred by awarding Logan
possession of UP&L's local distribution facilities.

Section 424

does not, expressly or impliedly, give the annexing municipality
the right to take over the utility's facilities in the annexed
area.

-11-

ARGUMENT
I.

SECTION 424 MUST BE INTERPRETED TO REQUIRE COMPENSATION FOR
ALL DEDICATED FACILITIES WHEREVER LOCATED, INCLUDING UP&L'S
SUBSTATIONS AND GENERATION FACILITIES.
The district court's ruling that UP&L was entitled to

compensation only for its distribution facilities located in the
annexed areas ignored the plain meaning of Section 424 as well as
the clear legislative purpose for which the statute was enacted.
Section 424 is not limited to facilities which happen to be
located in the territory the municipality has annexed.

The stat-

ute provides that if a municipality wishes to provide electrical
service to customers of a private utility in an annexed area, the
municipality must first pay to the utility a sum equal to the
fair market value of the utility's facilities dedicated to provide service to the affected area.—3/

2/

10-2-424. Electric utility service in annexed area.
Whenever the electric consumers of the area being
annexed are receiving electric utility services from sources
other than the annexing municipality, the municipality may
not, without the consent of the electric utility, furnish
its electric utility services to the electric consumers
until the municipality has reimbursed the electric utility
company which previously provided the services for the fair
market value of those facilities dedicated to provide service to the annexed area. If the annexing municipality and

Footnote continued on next page.
-12-

In the present case, UP&L presented evidence,
unrebutted by Logan, that its integrated network of distribution
substation and generation facilities, both inside and outside the
annexed areas, was dedicated to serve those areas.

The district

court's refusal to order compensation for all of those dedicated
facilities was contrary to the language and intent of the statute, and contrary to the undisputed evidence.
A.

Background Of The Statute.
Section 424 was originally enacted in 1983 (1983 Utah

Laws ch. 247, S 2) in response to disputes between private utility companies and municipalities over service to annexed territory.

See, e.g., CP National Corp. v. Public Service Commission,

638 P.2d 519 (Utah 1981) (questioning whether municipalities possessed authority to condemn electrical power system); CP National
Corp. v. City of St. George, No. C81-0182J slip op. (D. Utah Apr.
10, 1981) (granting a preliminary injunction preventing a city
from competing with a certificated utility within an annexed

Footnote continued from previous page.
the electric utility cannot agree on the fair market value,
it shall be determined by the state court having
jurisdiction.
Utah Code Ann. S 10-2-424 (1987).

-13-

area).

A 1982 law review article focused attention on the prob-

lem and called for the Legislature to determine (1) who is entitled to provide electrical service to an annexed area, and (2)
the amount of compensation a utility displaced from an annexed
area is entitled to receive for the loss of its business.
National Corp. v. Public Service Commission:

CP

The Jurisdictional

Ambiguity Surrounding Municipal Power Systemsr 1982 Utah L. Rev.
913, 930-932 & n. 144.
As originally enacted, Section 424 provided a utility
and its ratepayers two-pronged protection from the loss of busi4/
ness in annexed territory. First, Section 424 required an

i/

As originally enacted in 1983, Section 424 read as follows:
[W]henever the residents of the area being
annexed are receiving electric utility services from sources other than the annexing
municipality, the municipality may not without the consent of the electric utility furnish its municipality utility services to
such residents until the following conditions
have been satisfied:
(1) The franchise from the county or
other political subdivision under which the
electric utility services were being furnished has expired.
(2) The municipality has reimbursed the
electric utility company which previously
provided such services the fair market value

Footnote continued on next page.
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annexing municipality to wait until the expiration of the electric utility's franchise before providing electrical service.
1983 Utah Laws ch. 247, § 2 (amended 1985).

Second, the statute

required the municipality to reimburse the electric utility company for the fair market value of the the utility's facilities
dedicated to provide service to the annexed area.

Fair market

value was measured by the facility's replacement cost less depreciation.

Id.
Senator Sowards, the sponsor of the 1983 bill in the

Senate, explained the problems that gave rise to Section 424:
When a utility is granted a certificate of convenience and necessity to serve a community, they
not only have to provide facilities, transmission
facilities in the community, but they have to provide generation facilities and anticipate for
years ahead to take care of that community. Now,
one of the things that has been happening
recently, is that cities have been annexing some
Footnote continued from previous page.
as determined by replacement costs less
depreciation of its facilities which are dedicated to provide service to the annexed
area. If the annexing municipality and the
electric utility cannot agree on the fair
market value, it shall be determined by the
state court having jurisdiction.
(3) The provisions of subsection (1) are
inapplicable if the number of residents
affected is less than three in the area to be
annexed.
1983 Utah Laws ch. 247, S 2 (amended 1985).
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of the areas that the utility has been serving,
and then the utility's area has become a no mans
[sic] land. The question is: Does the utility
get to continue to serve that? Does the municipal
entity which has a municipal utility get to serve
it? Who takes care of the facilities? Who takes
care of that excess generating capacity that was
purchased at great cost?
Transcript of Senate Debate on H.B. 354, 1983 Legis., at 1 (Mar.
9, 1983); Ex. D-8.-7
The Legislature amended Section 424 in 1985. The
amendment removed one of the two safeguards provided to utilities
in the 1983 enactment, the requirement that an annexing municipality wait until the expiration of the existing utility's franchise before displacing the utility from the annexed area. However, the amendments retained the language requiring the municipality to compensate the utility for the fair market value of the
facilities dedicated to providing service to the annexed area.
The Legislature also broadened the term "fair market value" as
used in Section 424 by eliminating the reference to reproduction
cost less depreciation as the sole basis for valuation.

^/

UP&L introduced into evidence certified copies of transcripts of the Senate and House debates on H.B. 354, 1983
Legis., and the Senate and House debates on S.B. 191 1985
Legis. (Exhibits D-5, D-6, D-7, & D-8).
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B.

As Used In Section 424, The Term "Dedicated" Requires
Reimbursement For Any Facility To The Extent It Is Used
To Deliver Electricity To The Annexed Area.

1.

The Meaning of "Dedicated" In The Public Utility Industry Controls.
The general legal meaning of "dedicate" is "to appro-

priate and set apart one's private property to some public use."
Black's Law Dictionary 371 (5th Ed. 1979); Toledo, Peoria & Western R. R. v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., 547 F. Supp. 140, 141
(CD. 111. 1982); Corey v. City of San Diego, 329 P.2d 99, 103,
163 Cal. App. 2d 65 (1958).

See also Leo M. Bertaqnole, Inc. v.

Pine Meadows Ranches, 639 P.2d 211 (Utah 1981) (real property
dedicated to public use as roadway).

Dedication of property to a

public use does not transfer title to a governmental entity, but
reserves in the owner of the property all legal rights "compatible with the full exercise and enjoyment of the public use for
which the property was dedicated."

Toledo, Peoria & Western R.

R. v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., 547 F. Supp. 140, 141 (CD. 111.
1982) (emphasis added).
A public utility is a private corporation that dedicates its production and distribution facilities for utility
service to the public.

See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-2-1(20)

(Supp. 1988) (defining public utility) t 54-3-1 (1986) (general
statement of utility's duty to public).
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"Dedicated" is

synonymous with "used and useful", a term that defines the property a utility may include in its rate base (the property upon
which it is entitled to receive a fair rate of return from its
ratepayers).

"It is only to the extent the facilities are used

and useful to the consumers that they are included in the rate
base."

Committee on Consumer Serv. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 595

P.2d 871, 874 (Utah 1979), cert, denied 444 U.S. 1014 (1980).
See also In re Union Elec. Co., 24 P.U.R. 4th 234, 244-246 (111.
Commerce Comm'n 1978) (power plant located outside state "dedicated" to Illinois service, therefore, included in rate base).
See also Tr. 40.
Where a term used in a statute has a well-known trade
or business usage, the term is presumed to have been used by the
legislature in that technical sense.

Order of Ry. Conductors v.

Swan, 329 U.S. 520, 525 (1947) (industry usage of railroad term
controlled statutory interpretation); Haynie v. Northern Pac. Ry.
Co., 158 Mont. 247, 490 P.2d 715, 716 (1971) (seismographic
industry usage controlled construction of statutory term).

The

rule applies to statutes involving utility service as well.
Simon v. State Examiners of Electricians, 395 Mass. 238, 479
N.E.2d 649, 652 (1985).
The uncontroverted testimony before the district court
established that the term "dedicated" has a specialized trade
-18-

usage in the electrical utility industry.

Orrin Colby, Vice

President, Controller, and Chief Accounting Officer of UP&L, testified as follows:
Q
. . .can you say whether or not the term "dedicated for
service" as it applies to electric utility properties has a
generally accepted meaning within the utility industry?
A

Yes, it certainly does.

Q

And what is that meaning?

A
There are two ways in which it is generally phrased.
Either dedicated for service or used and useful. And it
depends on the jurisdiction that you are in as to how that
terminology is used. In Wyoming, for example, the "useful"
concept is or [sic] definition is more commonly used. In
Utah, "dedicated facilities" is. By that we are talking
about the facilities of the company and I'm talking here in
terms of the industry norms and as it's used for regulatory
purposes in this state. We're talking about the facilities
of the company from the meter on the customer's premises
back to the generating station or source of fuel in some
cases, all of which are dedicated for the purpose of providing service. And that is the industry norm and the state
standard that is used for regulatory purposes.
Tr. 40c

Mr* Colby's testimony that the industry usage of the

term "dedicated" or "dedicated to service" includes all facilities "from the meter on the customer's premises back to the generating station" was not rebutted by Logan.

Logan's expert wit-

ness, Mr. Tone, conceded on cross-examination that to the extent
a generating facility, substation, or other equipment is used to
provide service to a customer, the equipment is "dedicated" under
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the usage of that term in the electric utility industry.

Tr. 89

- 92.
Thus, there can be no question that UP&Lfs substations
and generation facilities, as well as its local distribution
lines, were "dedicated" to serving the annexed areas.

Under Sec-

tion 424, the district court was bound to award UP&L the fair
market value of those dedicated facilities regardless of whether
they were physically inside or outside the territorial limits of
Logan.
2.

The Legislative History Of Section 424 Confirms The
Interpretation That Compensation Is Required For Dedicated Facilities Located Outside The Annexed Area.
As demonstrated in the preceding section, the term

"dedicated" as used in Section 424 is unambiguous; it covers all
facilities used and useful in providing service to the annexed
areae

Accordingly, the Court need look no further than the plain

meaning of the statute.

However, if the Court does look further,

it will find that the legislative history confirms that plain
meaning.
In interpreting legislative history, the comments made
by sponsors of legislation during legislative debates are given
particular weight. 2A N. Singer, Sutherland On Statutes And Statutory Construction S 48.15 (4th ed. 1984).

See Olson v. Salt

Lake City School Dist., 724 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1986); Thomas v.
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Kinqsley, 85 N.J. Super. 357, 204 A.2d 724, 732 (1964), aff'd 43
N.J. 524, 206 A.2d 161 (1965).
Senator Sowards, the Senate sponsor of the bill enacting Section 424 in 1983, indicated that the bill's primary purpose was to require reimbursement to a utility for that portion
of its generating plants that were formerly used to serve the
annexed area.

In his opening statements in introducing House

Bill 354, he asked rhetorically:

"Who takes care of that excess

generating capacity that was purchased at great cost?"
replied:

He

"For this reason the purpose of this bill is to provide

that electric utilities are fairly paid for their facilities and
equipment in areas which they are serving when they are annexed
by a municipality with a system of its own."

Transcript of Sen-

ate Debate on H.B. 354, 1983 Legis., at 1, (Ex. D-8).
Senator Sowards noted that simply allowing a municipality to displace the utility "leaves the utility without any compensation for the facilities which have been developed to serve
that area, and places the burden of paying for the unrecovered
costs on the other ratepayers of the state."

Id. at 2.

See also

Id. at 9; (Ex. D-8).
The 1983 legislative history leaves no doubt that the
term "dedicated" was intended to include all facilities used to
produce or deliver electricity to the annexed territory.
-21-

Since

that term did not change in the 1985 amendments, the 1983 history
governs the interpretation of the statute today.

It is signifi-

cant to notef however, that the discussions of the 1985 amendments (which dealt with the expiration of the franchise and the
measure of fair market value) reaffirm the 1983 history as to the
meaning of "dedicated."

In the House Debates on the 1985 amend-

ment, Representative Jenkins, the House sponsor of the bill,
responded to a question from Representative Wasden as follows:
It is not replacement, it's the fair market value
at that time and the word "dedicated" in there,
Representative, means not just, sayr the line running from the telephone pole into the home, its
also all the lines running all the way back to the
plant that they get it from and so forth. So its
those dedicated and its a fair market value.
Transcript of House Debate on S.B. 191, 1985 Legis., at 2, (Ex.
D-6) (emphas is added).
Representative Jenkins also indicated that compensation
was required for all substations and generating plants that have
been providing service to the annexed area:
Representative Cromar:
Yea, a question to the sponsor. I really don't
see anywhere in this Bill where the protection is
to substations. . . .
I don't see any protection
to private companies on their substation and those
type of things.
Representative Jenkins:
That's just what I explained to Representative
Wasden. The word "dedicated" means anything that
-22-

happens to be on the line that requires them to
get the services into their area whether its substations, whether it's their plant or whatever.
Id, at 3 (emphasis added).
This clear evidence of the legislative intent to
require fair compensation for all of the utility's dedicated
facilities, substations and plants outside the annexed area is
further buttressed by the legislature's rejection of an amendment
that would have narrowed the scope of Section 424, The initial
version of the 1985 bill had deleted "dedicated" and had substituted "used exclusively".

See S.B. 191. (Ex. D-3).-

However,

when the bill was reported out of the committee to the Senate,
the committee had reinserted "dedicated".

Transcript of Senate

Debate on S.B. 191, 1985 Legis., at p. 1. (Ex. D-5). The Legislature thus considered and rejected the concept of limiting compensation to only those facilities located within the annexed
7/
territory.-

£'

UP&L introduced into evidence certified copies of the
enrolled copy of 1985 Legislature S.B. 191, the introduced
copy of S.B. 191, and the two proposed amendments to S.B.
191 (Ex. D-3).

1/

Legislative action on a proposed amendment to a bill is relevant to interpreting the statute passed. 2A N. Singer,
Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction § 48.18

Footnote continued on next page.
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3.

Fairness And Common Sense Require That Section 424 Be
Interpreted To Compensate UP&L For All Facilities Used
To Provide Service.
Even without considering the plain language of the

statute and the legislative history of the term "dedicated", Section 424 should be interpreted to require compensation for facilities located outside the annexed area to the extent they are
used to serve the annexed area.
The purpose of Section 424 is to protect the utility's
ratepayers from having to absorb the costs of facilities stranded
by annexation.

As Senator Sowards stated:

[T]he problem is that a lot of times, the cities
have taken the position when they annex, that they
have the right to immediately be serving the
utility's customers in the area of annexation.
This position leaves the utility without any compensation for the facilities which have been
developed to serve that area, and places the burden of paying for the unrecovered costs on the
other ratepayers of the state. Now I think you
should get that position, because if they lose
that, then somebody else has to pick it up, and
this is certainly unfair both to the utility and
the other ratepayers.

Footnote continued from previous page.
(4th ed. 1984). The rejection of a proposed amendment indicates that the legislature did not intend the bill to
include the effect of the provisions rejected, id.; City of
Manhattan v. Eriksen, 204 Kan. 150, 460 P.2d 622 (1969).
See also Donovan v. Hotel, Motel & Restaurant Employees, 700
F.2d 539, 545 n.8 (9th Cir. 1983).
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Transcript of Senate Debate, H.B. 54, 1983 Legis., at 2 (Mar. 9,
1983), (Ex. D-8).
A common sense interpretation of Section 424 requires
that the facilities for which a utility is to be compensated not
be limited to those physically located within the annexed area.
Electrical systems, by their nature, include distant generating
plants, transmission lines and substations, in addition to local
distribution facilities.

If 75% of the capacity of a substation

located outside Logan were being used to serve the annexed area,
UP&L should be compensated for 75% of the substation.

The fact

that smaller percentages are involved in this case does not alter
the logic or the necessary result.

If Logan can escape compen-

sating UP&L for dedicated facilities for the arbitrary reason
that the facilities happen to be located outside of the annexed
boundaries, the burden of paying for those facilities will be
unfairly shifted to UP&L and its ratepayers.

This would invite

municipalities throughout the state to raid UP&L of its customers
in adjacent areas and leave it with huge excess generating and
transmission capacity, to be borne entirely by UP&Lfs remaining
ratepayers.

It cannot be presumed that the Legislature intended

such a result.
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4.

This Court Should Direct The Trial Court To Award UP&L
Judgment In The Amount Of $434,987,
Section 424 requires a municipality to compensate a

utility for all facilities, wherever located, to the extent dedicated to provide service to customers in the annexed area.
UP&L's undisputed evidence established that the fair market value
of UP&L's dedicated facilities, including going concern value,
was $434,987.00.

Tr. 41-52; Ex. D-l, D-9.

There being no evi-

dence to controvert the amounts claimed, this Court should direct
the district court to enter judgment in favor of UP&L in the
amount of $434,987.00.
II.

LOGAN MAY NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY USE SECTION 424 TO EXPROPRIATE UP&LfS BUSINESS AND PROPERTY FOR LESS THAN LOGAN WOULD
HAVE PAID HAD IT PROCEEDED BY CONDEMNATION.
A.

The Utah And U.S. Constitutions Require That UP&L
Receive Compensation For All Property Taken Or Made
Less Useful.
The United States Constitution prohibits the taking of

private property for public use without just compensation.
Const, amend. V, amende XIV.

U.S.

The Utah Constitution provides a

broader protection, prohibiting private property from being
"taken or damaged" for public use without just compensation.
Utah Const, art. I, S 22. The trial court's award of compensation to UP&L for only the value of the physical facilities
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located in the annexed area violates these constitutional guarantees.
Although Logan did not commence formal condemnation
proceedings to acquire UP&Lfs business in the annexed areas, the
district court used Section 424 to accomplish much the same
result.

The district court's ruling allowed Logan to expropriate

UP&L's customers and its local distribution lines. The purpose
and effect of the relief ordered by the district court was virtually indistinguishable from a partial condemnation of UP&Lfs public utility system.

UP&L lost its local distribution facilities

and the going concern value of its business in the annexed areas.
UP&Lfs substations and generating facilities were damaged by
being severed from the business they were built to serve.

At the

very least, UP&L must receive the compensation to which it is
constitutionally entitled for the taking of and damage to its
business and facilities.
1.

UP&L Is Constitutionally Entitled To The Going Concern
Value Of Its Business In The Annexed Territory, Including The Value Of Its Franchise.
This Court has never addressed the issue of going con-

cern value in the condemnation of a utility system.

However,

courts in other jurisdictions uniformly recognize that compensation for the going concern value must be awarded where a utility
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business is being taken*2.

The rationale for this rule is that

business facilities in active operation have an added value to
the owner above and beyond their mere "scrap" value, which must
be taken into account if just compensation is to be awarded.

See

City of Omaha v. Omaha Water Co.r 218 U.S. 180, 203 (1910) ("the
difference between a dead plant and a live one is a real value");
4A Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain, S 15.44.
Courts applying the rule in the context of electric
utilities recognize that going concern value and franchise rights

See 4A Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain § 15.41, at pp.
15-94 (1985) ("when the plant of a public service corporation is taken by eminent domain, the corporation is not limited to the value of its physical property, or the cost of
reproducing the same, but is entitled to be paid the value
of its franchises and property taken together as a going
concern and as parts of one system. . . . " ) ; Twin Cities
Metro. Pub. Transit Area v. Twin City Lines, Inc., 224 N.W.
2d 121, 126 (1974) (an award of damages for going concern
value is appropriate for condemnation of public transit
business); Monaqehela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148
U.S. 312, 326 & 329 (1893) (just compensation under the
Fifth Amendment requires payment for productiveness of business being condemned); In re Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, 219
N.E.2d 410 (N.Y. App. 1966), remittitur amended, 221 N.E.2d
174 (N.Y. App. 1966), appeal dismissed, 386 U.S. 778 (1967),
(going concern value is a required element of just compensation in condemnation of transit company); City of Tucson v.
El Rio Water Co., 415 P.2d 872, 876-877 (Ariz. 1966) (going
concern value, including value of franchise rights, is constitutionally required); Bear Creek Water Assoc, Inc. v.
Town of Madison, 416 So.2d 399 (Miss. 1982), opinion on
other issues after removal, 816 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1987),
dismissed on other grounds, 510 So.2d 800 (Miss. 1987)
(water company entitled to going concern value of expropriated business).
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are separate elements of just compensation when a public
utility's facilities or customers are expropriated by a
9/ In City of Newark v. Delmarva Power & Light Co.,
municipality.Civil No. 83C-JL-10, slip op. (Del. Super. May 21, 1985) (a copy
is attached hereto as Appendix C), the City of Newark sought to
condemn certain distribution facilities of the Delmarva Power &
Light Company in order to supplant the company in providing electrical service to three customers who had been annexed to the
city.

The power company argued that it was entitled to compensa-

tion not only for its physical properties, but also for the value
of its franchise and for the going concern and goodwill value of
its service to the customers.

The court agreed, holding that the

While some courts focus on the valuation of franchise rights
independently of going concern value, other courts and commentators have noted that the value of any franchise rights
can be simply added to and considered as part of the overall
"going concern" value of the business. See In re City of
Redding, 1919F P.U.R. 415, 420 (Cal. R.R. Comm'n 1919)
(while a utililty is entitled to be compensated both for
franchise rights and for going concern value, franchise
value may be considered as an element of going concern).
See also City of Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U.S. 180, 203
(1910) (going concern value exists apart from the value of
any franchise); Flecha Caida Water Co. v. City of Tucson,
420 P.2d 198, 201 (Ariz.App. 1966) (even where business is
not a going concern, franchise is compensable). See generally, Orgel, Valuation Under Eminent Domain, S 214-216 (2d
ed. 1953) (discussing compensation for franchise rights and
going concern value).
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company's franchise was a property right that included the going
concern value of the business.
In a similar case involving a city's expropriation of
facilities used by the Mississippi Power & Light Company ("MP&L")
to provide service inside a city's limits, the Mississippi
Supreme Court held that just compensation included the value of
the company's operating rights:
MP&L's franchise to serve Planters is valuable
property, and its protection against being taken
for public use cannot be vouchsafed by the constitution the same as any other property.
Clarksdale's statutory right to condemn MP&L's
facility cannot be construed in contravention of
MP&L's right to have its franchise protected
against expropriation without just
compensation. . . .
Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. City of Clarksdale, 288 So.2d 9
(Miss. 1973).
In City of Thibodaux v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
225 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. La. 1963), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 373 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1967), cert, denied, 389 U.S. 975
(1967), the federal district court for the District of Louisiana
also held that a municipality that takes over a public utility
business in an annexed area must provide compensation for the
going concern value of the business.

The court distinguished the

condemnation of a public utility from typical real estate condemnation, and held that just compensation included the value of the
-30-

utility's franchise right to provide service in the annexed area.
The court reasoned:
• . • the instant situation presents a different
case. The city is seizing this property to use it
in the same manner and for the same purpose as its
present use. The city is in fact seizing a going
business to continue it as a going business. . . .
The city is not buying the poles, lines and equipment to clear them away and build a school. The
city wants the power company's distribution system
and its customers. . . .
The law of Louisiana says that when a state builds
a road and must destroy a gasoline station to do
it the state need not pay for a gasoline station
because the land and a building is what it wants
and what it gets, not a gasoline station
business. . . . The judgment of this court,
throughout this litigation, has consistently been
that when it is the business itself that is being
seized, it must be valued in the only way that
businesses can be valued, i.e., according to its
ability to produce income. (emphasis added).
id. at 667.
The cases cited and discussed above leave no doubt that
UP&L is constitutionally entitled to recover, in addition to fair
market value of its physical facilities, the going concern value,
including the franchise, arising from the fact that the expropriated facilities and customers are part of an active business
operation.

A constitutional interpretation of Section 424 can

provide nothing less.
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2.

UP&L Is Constitutionally Entitled To Compensation For
Severance Damage, i.e., Damage To Its Remaining Facilities Resulting From Logan's Expropriation Of The
Annexed Customers And Local Distribution Lines.
The Utah and United States Constitutions also require

that UP&L receive compensation from Logan at least for the damage
caused by the severance of the annexed customers and local distribution lines from the remainder of UP&L?s system.
There is no Utah case law addressing severance damages
for the partial condemnation of a public utility system or other
active business operation.

However, Utah law mandates severance

damages whenever part of a "bundle" of property rights or a single economic unit is condemned, and the remaining property is
thereby reduced in value or made useless.

See, e.g., State v.

Williams, 22 Utah 2d 301, 452 P.2d 548 (1969) (upholding award of
severance damages for two noncontiguous parcels of real property,
based on evidence that the taken parcel and the two remaining
parcels were used as part of an integrated ranching operation);
Provo City Corp. v. Knudsen, 558 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977) (upholding
an award of severance damage to real property caused by the taking of an aerial easement, over city's objection that physical
severance of a parcel of real property was required).
Moreover, in North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water &
Irrigation Co., 118 Utah 600, 223 P.2d 577 (1950), this Court
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recognized in dicta that upon the partial condemnation of a water
system, the condemning authority is liable for severance damages
to the remainder of the system.

The Court stated:

[i]t has been held that if a condemnor seeks to
condemn only part of a system, it is liable for
the amount it depreciates the remaining
portion. . . .
223 P.2d at 584.
The weight of authority in other jurisdictions supports
the award of severance damage in partial condemnations of utility
systems.

In In re Sacramento Municipal Utility District, 48

P.U.R. (NS) 322, 337 (1942), the California Railroad Commission,
in addressing the amount and elements of compensation required in
the partial condemnation of distribution facilities of an electric utility, stated:
[i]n practical effect, the act of severance
involves the element of violence, with attendant
injury to the system from which the part is severed. In any given case, the severance is
attended by partial disability, at least, with
respect to the remaining portion, resulting in a
diminution of the service value or productiveness
thereof.
In addition to compensation for the loss of the
property taken measured in terms of the fair market value of such property, justice requires that
the condemnor be further compensated through an
award for (a) the amount of physical'damages suffered and (b) for all such loss, if any, as may be
suffered by reason of a diminution in value, due
to the severances, of the property remaining after
the severance. This doctrine is supported by the
great weight of authority.
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Id. at 333.
Similarly, in City of Thibodaux v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., supra, the federal district court held that severance
damages must be awarded where part of an integrated public utility system is condemned, and the remainder is thereby made less
useful.

225 F.Supp. at 661.

In describing the damaging effect

of the partial taking of the electric utility's distribution
lines on the remainder of its system, the court stated as
follows:
[i]n the City of Thibodaux proper the only tangible equipment of Power Company is its ultimate
distribution system made up principally of lights,
poles, and wiring. The condemnation involved in
this action is limited to the corporate limits of
the City. However, outside of the corporate limits are the generators and sub-stations of Power
Company which supply the power to the lines and
poles within the corporate limits. These
extra-urban facilities . . . are extensive in size
and diversification, and are, in fact, what give
the intra-urban facilities their value. . . . the
expropriation will render useless, in some degree,
the extra-urban facilities of the Power Company
which had formerly supplied the power to the
intra-urban facilities.
Id.

Accord, City of Newark v. Delmarva Power & Light, Civil No.

83C-JL-1Q, slip op. (Del. Super. May 21, 1985) (recognizing electric utility's right to severance damages for partial condemnation of distribution facilities in annexed areas); City of Fresno
v. San Joaquin Light & Power Corp., 19 P.U.R. (N.S.) 73, 83
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(1936) (electric utility entitled to damages to physical plant
which is rendered temporarily less useful or idle after the taking of its distribution facilities within city limits).
Logan has expropriated only a part of UP&Lfs distribution network.

The distribution lines serving the annexed custom-

ers were physically connected to the substations and generating
facilities for which UP&L received no compensation.

These sub-

stations, distribution and generation facilities were part of a
single operating unit, and each component was essential to UP&L's
service to the annexed customers.

Had Logan proceeded by condem-

nation, the above authorities would clearly require it to compensate UP&L for severance damages to its remaining facilities.
Logan cannot avoid this constitutional requirement simply by proceeding under Section 424.
3.

The Authority Delegated To Municipalities In The Utah
Constitution To Furnish Local Utility Services Does Not
Limit UP&Lfs Right To Just Compensation.
The district court based its ruling on a determination

that if Logan had to pay for more than the physical facilities
within the annexed area, the economic burden would deny Logan its
"constitutional right" to provide utility service to its residents.

In his Memorandum Decision, Judge Chri'stopherson stated:
An award of such compensation would make it economically unfeasible for any municipality to supply the
electrical utilities to customers in the annexed area.
This effectively denies them their constitutional right
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to supply electrical services to those that may become
citizen's of the municipality by means of annexation.
R. 497.

See also Finding of Fact No. 7, R. 516.
The district court's decision elevates the powers of

municipally owned utility systems above the fundamental rights of
individual property owners.

Apparently, the district court was

referring to Article XI, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution,
which delegates to cities the authority to operate local utility
systems.

This provision, however, is not a grant of constitu-

tional "rights" in the sense of an individual's constitutional
rights.
The exercise of governmental power by Logan to take or
damage UP&L's private property falls squarely within the scope of
Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution and the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.

Article

XI, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution cannot be construed as
giving a municipality the right to take private property without
just compensation.

See Hughes Tool Co. v. Superior Court, 91

Ariz. 154, 370 P*2d 646, 649 (1962) (interpreting state constitution as permitting municipality to take or damage land without
paying compensation violated Fourteenth Amendment).
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B.

The Constitutional Measure Of Valuation.

1.

The Standard Formula For Compensation For The Taking Of
An Electrical Distribution System Is Reproduction Cost
New Less Depreciation Of The Distribution Facilities
Plus The Going Concern Value (Including The Franchise)
Of The Business Plus Severance Damages To The Remaining
Facilities.
Recent cases involving municipal takeover of electric

distribution systems (but not related transmission and generation
facilities) have established that the utility is constitutionally
entitled to four separate areas of compensation:
L

Reproduction cost new less depreciation of the
distribution facilities taken or rendered
useless;

2.

Going concern value of the business taken;

3.

The value of the utility's franchise; and

4.

Severance damages to the remaining facilities.

See City of Thibodeaux, 225 F. Supp. at 670; City of Newark v.
Delmarva Power & Light Co., slip op. at 4.

In re City of Redding

1919F P.U.R. 415 (Cal. R.R. Comm'n 1919) provides an example of
the formula used in such cases:
Just Compensation.
(a) Valuation of physical property plus
overhead on basis of reproduction cost less
depreciation.
(b)

Franchise value.

(c) Going concern including development
cost.
-37-

Then
(a) + (b) + (c) = "Fair Value of Property"
Plus
(d)

Severance damages.
Then

(a) + (b) + (c) + (d) = "Just Compensation."
Id. at 420.
In the present case, UP&L presented unrebutted evidence
of the compensation it would have received based upon the minimum
constitutional standard.

That evidence was summarized in Exhibit

D-10 as follows?
Alternative Compensation
(Under Eminent Domain)
1.

Market Value - Distribution

$ 117,000

2.

Severance Damage - Substation

5,405

3.

Severance Damage - Generation

127,007

4.

Going Concern Value

5.

Total

94,156
$ 343,568

At the very least, UP&L was entitled to this measure of
compensation.
2.

Going Concern Valuation, Including the Franchise.
As noted above, the cases involving the condemnation of

utility properties make it clear that UP&L is entitled to
-38-

something more than compensation for "the bare bones" of its
distribution facilities taken or rendered useless by Logan.
According to Nichols:
. • . compensation is not limited to the bare
bones of the plant, its physical properties . . .
nor to what it would cost to reproduce each of its
physical features. The value, in fairness and
justice, must include whatever is contributed by
the fact that these items are connected and constitute a complete and operating plant. The difference in value between a dead plant and a live
one is represented by what is known as the "going
value".
4A Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain § 15.44.

See also City of

Phoenix v. Consolidated Water Co., 415 P.2d 866, 868 (Ariz.
1966); Dade County v. General Waterworks Corp., 267 So.2d 633,
639 (Fla. 1972).
In the present case, going concern value must include
the value of UP&L's Cache County franchise giving it the right to
serve the annexed territory, which has twenty-six years remaining.

A franchise obtained by an electric utility from the appro-

priate prior governmental entity is a property right which may be
terminated or modified by an annexing municipality only through
due process of law. Mountain States Tel. &. Tel. Co. v. Town of
Belen, 56 N.M. 415, 244 P.2d 1112, 1120 (1952); Town of Coushatto
v. Valley Electric Membership Corp., 139 So.2d 822, 830 (La. App.
1962).
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As to franchise value, Nichols states:
[i]t is well settled that the franchise of a public service corporation is property which must be
paid for, unless it is expressly provided in the
statute by which the franchise is granted and that
it need not be. . . . the reasonable value of the
franchise taken or the extent to which it has been
damaged is ordinarily the measure of damages,
4A Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain S 15.42.
Valuation of a franchise or going concern based upon
ability to produce income has been approved by courts in cases
involving the taking of electrical distribution systems.
Delmarva, slip op. at 4; City of Thibodaux, 225 F.Supp. at 667.
In the present case, UP&Lfs evidence, unrebutted by Logan, demonstrated that going concern value and franchise value, expressed
in terms of the ability to produce income, equalled at least
$94,156.00.
3.

Severance Damage Valuation.

As noted above, the constitutional requirement of just
compensation requires that UP&L receive compensation for damages
to its remaining facilities caused by the severance of the
annexed customers from its system.

The authorities recognize

several approaches for calculating severance damages in a partial
taking of a utility.

According to Nichols, courts may consider

the depreciation in the market value of the remaining facilities,
the degree to which the remaining facilities are rendered useless
-40-

or will require rehabilitation, and any increase in capital costs
that will be imposed upon the utility's remaining operations. 4A
Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain § 15.45.
In the present case, UP&L presented evidence of its
incurred unavoidable costs attributable to its idled generation
facilities and substations. These amounts equalled $127,007 for
generation and $5,405 for substations.

(The amounts were not

controverted by any evidence Logan presented.)

Even the most

narrow view of severance damages would permit UP&L to recover
those amounts because (1) they represent the costs UP&L will continue to incur until its idled facilities can be absorbed through
load growth elsewhere in the system, and (2) UP&L will lose the
revenues to cover those costs as a direct result of the
severance.
III. SECTION 424 DOES NOT ALLOW A MUNICIPALITY TO ACQUIRE OWNERSHIP OF A UTILITY COMPANY'S PROPERTY.
The trial court's ruling that Logan is entitled to ownership of UP&L's facilities located within the annexed area under
Section 424 is not supported by the plain language of the statute.

Section 424 does not give the annexing municipality owner-

ship of the utility's distribution facilities located in the
annexed area.
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Private ownership of property is not interfered with
lightly*

Under Utah law, power of the government to acquire own-

ership of private property without the consent of the owner must
be expressly provided for by statute.

This Court has previously

stated:
[P]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged except for purposes of public utility
and for adequate compensation. This prerogative is only allowed where the letter of the
law permits it and then only under careful
observance of the rules prescribed for the
protection of the owner.
Moyle v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 201, 176 P.2d 882, 885 (1947)
(emphasis added).
§ 3*213 (1985 edo) 0

See also 1A Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain
Thus, in Great Salt Lake Authority v. Island

Ranching Co., 18 Utah 2d 276, 421 P.2d 504 (1966), this Court
held that a statute did not invest a governmental entity with
power to condemn property on Antelope Island where the statute
listed several means by which the entity could acquire the property, but did not expressly authorize condemnation.
505-506.

421 P.2d at

See also Bertagnoli v. Baker, 117 Utah 348, 215 P.2d

626, 628 (1950) (right of eminent domain strictly construed
because infringes on rights of individual ownership of property).
Nothing in Section 424 refers to acquisition of property by the municipality through compulsory means or otherwise.
The only right Section 424 grants a municipality is the right "to
-42-

furnish its electric utility services" to electrical consumers
within the annexed area.

Utah Code Ann. S 10-2-424.

If the leg-

islature had intended Section 424 to grant municipalities the
power to condemn and acquire ownership of a utility's property,
it could have so provided in the statute.

See, e.g., 18 Okla.

St. Ann. § 437.2(k)(1986) (authorizing annexing municipality to
"acquire" rural electrical cooperative's distribution facilities
in annexed area).
The fact that Section 424 does not entitle Logan to
ownership of UP&L's local distribution facilities does not, however, diminish UP&L's right to just compensation.

There is noth-

ing inconsistent with awarding UP&L a full measure of compensation without also awarding Logan ownership of the facilities. As
this Court has stated:
In earlier times it was held that property could be
deemed to be taken, within the meaning of constitutional provisions, only when the owner was wholly
deprived of its possession, use, and occupation. But a
more liberal doctrine has long been established, and an
actual, physical taking of property is not necessary to
entitle its owner to compensation. A man's property
may be taken, within the meaning of constitutional provisions such as ours, although his title and possessional remain undisturbed. To deprive him of the ordinary beneficial use and enjoyment of his property is,
in law, equivalent to the taking of it, and is as much
a taking as though the property itself were actually
taken. Authorities to this effect are numerous, and
this principle of law has become embodied in many
Constitutions (taken or damaged) and in many statutes.
It is so with respect to our own.
-43-

Oregon Short Line Ry. Co. v. Jones, 29 Utah 147, 80 P. 732, 734)
(1905) (emphasis added).
Logan's replacement of UP&L as the supplier of electricity to the annexed areas deprived UP&L of the beneficial use
of its property.

UP&L is entitled to just compensation for those

facilities even though it retains legal title to them.
CONCLUSION
This case involves an issue of great importance to UP&L
and its ratepayers:

Who is to bear the cost of municipal expan-

sion into areas previously served by a public utility?

UP&L has

made a significant investment in its substations and generating
facilities in order to satisfy its statutory mandate to provide
reliable electrical service to its customers throughout the state
of Utah.

The Utah

Legislature enacted Section 424 to protect

public utilities and their ratepayers from being unfairly burdened with the cost of facilities that are made useless or less
useful as a result of municipal expansion.

Interpreting the sec-

tion to compensate UP&L only for its local distribution lines is
erroneous and is contrary to law.
Moreover, the district court's interpretation of Section 424 violates the constitutional requirement that UP&L
receive just compensation for its expropriated business as well
as damages for its remaining facilities.
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Accordingly, this Court should reverse the decision of
the district court.

The district court should be directed to

award UP&L $434,987, representing the uncontroverted fair market
value of its dedicated facilities, and order that the local
distribution facilities be returned to UP&L.

Alternatively, UP&L

requests this Court to establish $343,568 as the minimum amount
of compensation to which UP&L is entitled under the United States
and Utah Constitutions for the taking of its distribution
facilities, for going concern value and for severance damages.
DATED this ^ *%

day of February 1989.

W. Cullen Battle
Douglas J. Payne
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
A Professional Corporation
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this o * \

day of February

1989, I caused four true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the
following:
W. Scott Barrett
City of Logan
255 North Main Street
Logan, Utah 84321

Appendix A

FKAJ&CHJSE SUPPLEMENT NO. 271
(Conpdatkm of Jannery h l f l l )

CACHE COUNTY, UTAH
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
(General Electric Service)
Passed September 13, 1966; expires AtfUJ* 5. 2016.
Granted to Utah Power 4 Light Company.
Validity approved: General Counsel latter datad February 17, 1967.
An ordinance granting to Utah Power 4 light Company, its w u s a w i
and assigns, an electric light, heat and power franchise.

The Board of County Commissioners of Cache County,
Utah, Ordains as Follows:
Section 1. That there is hereby granted to Utah
Power & Light Company, its successors and assigns
(herein called the "Grantee"), the right, privilege, or
franchise until August 5, 2016, to construct, maintain
and operate in, along, upon and across the present and
future roads, highways and public places in Cache
County, Utah, and its successors, electric light and power
lines, together with all the necessary or desirable appurtenances (including underground conduits, poles, towers,
wires, transmission lines, and telegraph and telephone
lines for its own use), for the purpose of transmitting
and supplying electricity to said County, the inhabitants
thereof, and persons and corporations beyond the limits
thereof, for light, heat, power and other purposes.
Section 2. Poles and towers shall be so erected as
to interfere as little as possible with traffic over said
roads and highways. The opening of roads and the erection of poles and towers shall be controlled by the ordinances of said County, but will not be made so as to
unreasonably interfere with the proper operation of said
lines.
SectioB 3. All lines constructed under this grant
shall be constructed in accordance with established practices with respect to electrical construction.

Section 4. The County shall in no way be liable or
responsible for any accident or damage that may occur
in the construction, operation or maintenance by the
Grantee of its lines and appurtenances hereunder, and
the acceptance of this franchise shall be deemed an agreement on the part of said Grantee, its successors and
assigns, to indemnify said County and hold it harmless
against any and all liability, loss, cost, damage or expense
*hich may accrue to said County by reason of the neglect, default or misconduct of the Grantee in the construction, operation or maintenance of its lines and
appurtenances hereunder.
Section 5. The Grantee shall file its written acceptance of this franchise with the County Clerk within
thirty (30) days after its passage.
Section 6. This ordinance shall take effect as soon
as it shall be published, or on the fifteenth day after its
passage, whichever shall occur later.
Passed by the County Commissioners of Cache County, Utah, this 13th day of September, 196&
Todd & Weston
Chairman of the Board of County Commissioners
Attest:
Iver L. Larsen
County Clerk, Ex-Officio Clerk of
the Board of County Commissioners
(SEAL)
NOTE: Certificate of Convenience and Necessity granted
by the Public Service Commission of Utah in
Case No. 5776, Order No. 1581, dated January
26,1967, covers this franchise.

Appendix B

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE C O M SSI ON OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Application
of UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
for a Certificate of Convenience
and Necessity to Exercise the
Rights and Privileges Conferred
by Franchise Granted by Cache
County, Utah.

Case No. 5776
O R D E R
Certificate of Convenience
and Necessity No. 1581

This case being at issue upon application on file and
having been duly heard and submitted by the parties hereto, and
full investigation of the matters and things involved having
been had, and the Commission having on the date hereof, made and
filed a Report containing its findings and conclusions, which
Report is hereby referred to and made a part hereof:
IT IS ORDERED that Utah Power & Light Company is hereby
granted Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No. 1581 authorizing it to exercise the rights and privileges conferred by franchise
ordinance dated September 13, 1966, by Cache County, Utah.
Dated this 26th

day of

January

, 1967.

s/ DONALD HACKING
DONALD HACKING, Chairman
(Seal)

s/ HAL S. BENNETT
HAL S. BENNETT, Commissioner
s/ D. FRANK WILKINS
D. FRANK WILK1NS, Commissioner

ATTEST:

?/ C, ?, PfSHSBAW. JB.
C. R. OPENSHAW, JR.
Secretary
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1ST CASE of Level 1 printed in FULL format.
CITY of NEWARK, a municipal corporation of the state of
Delaware Plaintiff, v. DELMARVA
POWER and LISHT CO., a
Delaware corporation Defendant.
Civil Action No. 83C-JL-10
Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County
Slip Opinion
January 22, 1985, Submitted
May 21, 1985, Decided
City of Newark's Motion for Partial Judgment of the Pleadings under Rule
12(c). Denied.
Thomas G. Hughes, Esquire of O'Donnell and Hughes, P.A., Wilmington for
Plaintiff.
Richard fc. Poole, Esquire and Gregory A . Inskip, Esquire of Potter Anderson
and Corroon, Wilmington for Defendant and Dale 6. Stoodley of Delmarva Power and
Light Company.
UNREPORTED OPINION
ORDER
This 21st day of May 1985,
The Court having before it a Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings
filed by the City of Newark ("Newark") and having considered the parties1
respective positions and the applicable law hereby denies said application for
reasons articulated herein:
1) Newark's Motion, filed pursuant to Super. Ct. R. Civ. Pro. 12(c), is now
properly one for Summary Judgment under Super. Ct. R. Civ. Pro. 56, the parties
having submitted matters outside the pleadings; and the Court rules on it as a
Summary Judgment Motion.
2) The incontroverted facts are that Newark seeks to condemn property
(i.e., lines, poles, and other tangible property) of Delmarva
Power &
Light Co. (" Delmarva" ) so that it can supplant Delmarva in providing
electricity distribution service to the residences at 825, 903, and 907 South
College Avenue in Newark (Rte. 896), properties which were annexed by Newark
in 1977. Delmarva challenges Newark's right to condemn the property, alleging
violations of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article
I, Section 8 of the Delaware Constitution. Specifically, Delmarva asserts that
Newark has demonstrated no valid public purpose nor has it provided just
compensation for the taking. Delmarva argues that Newark should compensate it
not only for Delmarva*s personal property but also for the value of Delmarva's
franchise and related rights; the going concern value and goodwill value of
its service to the three customers of 825, 903, and 907 South College Avenue;
and severance damages. Newark, in turn, asserts that Delmarva has no franchise
claim which would entitle it to compensation for loss of customers.
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3) Newark's Motion for Sumary Judgment may be granted only if, after a
consideration of the evidence In the light most favorable to Delmarva, the Court
concludes that Newark is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and there are
no material issues of fact present. Moore v. Sliemore, Del.Supr., 405 A.2d 679
(1979); Bradford, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., Del.Super., 301 A.2d 519
(1972).
4) The Court is satisfied that the instant condemnation action is a valid use
of Newark's power of eminent domain and that Newark has demonstrated that the
taking in question is for a public purpose. Newark operates under a Home Rule
Charter enacted in 1965 and as authorized by 22 Oel.C. 8 802. Section 405 of
that charter provides in pertinent part:
The city shall have the right to acquire the properties and rights of utility
companies, and further shall have, if it wishes to so exercise, the exclusive
right to provide water, sewer and electrical utility service within the
corporate limits of the city as they presently exist or shall in the future be
extended by annexation; provided, however, that in acquiring such utility
properties, whether by purchase, condemnation or other means, the city shall, in
all respects, adhere to the general laws of the State of Delaware; and provided
further that nothing in this section shall authorize the acquisition by the city
of any through electric transmission lines.
By Resolution No. 83-1, dated March 28, 1983, the Newark City Council
authorized the institution of the instant condemnation action. Furthermore, it
is settled law that furnishing power to householders is a public purpose, Mt.
Vemon-Uoodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30
(1916); Duck River Electric Membership Corp. v. Manchester, Tenn.Supr., 529
S.U.2d 202 (1975), and that a municipality may exercise its eminent domain power
to take the private property of a public service utility for public use. Long
Island Water Supply Co. v. The City of Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685 (1897); Shakopee
v. Minn, valley Electric Cooperative, Minn.Supr., 303 N.U.2d 58 (1981). See
also University of Delaware v. City of Newark, Del.Ch., C.A. No. 4760, Qui lien,
Ch. (November 25, 1975).
5) The Court is also satisfied that Delmarva possesses a franchise to supply
and distribute electric power to the households in question and that it should
be compensated for the taking of that franchise. Newark asserts that Delmarva
has no franchise claim which would entitle it to compensation for the loss of
customers, contending that Delmarva possesses, at best, a "limited" or "special"
franchise to erect poles and wires on public streets, which franchise is not
Interfered with by the taking of the service to three households. Newark's
argument, however, fails on either of two independent grounds. First, the Court
holds that the franchise granted by the State through action of the Levy Court
of New Castle County in 1924 to the American Power Co. (predecessor company to
Delmarva), which grants the right "to erect, perpetually maintain and operate
its lines . . ." (emphasis added), Includes the right to distribute electricity.
See generally Greater Wilmington Transportation Authority v. Kline, Del.Super.,
285 A.2d 819 (1971). This franchise right, which would be partially destroyed
by Newark's assumption of service to three of Delmarva*s customers, may not
constitutionally be taken without just compensation. See Nonongahela Navigation
Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893). City of Thlbodaux v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co., 225 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. La. 1963), aff'd in pertinent part, 373 F.2d
870 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 389 U.S. 975 (1967); Mississippi Power & Light Co.
v. City of Clarksdale, Mlss.Supr., 288 So.2d 9 (1973). Second, Newark is
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collaterally estopped from claiming that Deimarva has no compensable franchise
claim by virtue of the finding of Chancellor Seitr in prior litigation between
the parties that Delaware Power & Light Co., also a predecessor company to
Deimarva, Hhas been and is exercising a definite franchise to distribute
electricity which was granted by the State.- Delaware Power & Light Co. v. city
of Newark, Del.Ch., 140 A.2d 2S8, 261 (1958). See Tyndall v. Tyndall,
Del.Supr., 238 A.2d 343 (1968); Chrysler Corp. v. New Castle County, Del.Super.,
464 A.2d 75 (1983).
6) Moving established that Delaarva is entitled to compensation for its
persona, property as well as the loss of its franchise rights with respect to
the three customers whose service Newark seeks to acquire through these
condemnation proceedings, the remaining issue concerns the eeasure of
compensation. Although traditionally in a condemnation of real estate the
value of a business to the owner is not admissible to prove just compensation,
this is not the case where a public utility is directly taken over by a
condemning authority for operation. State v. Davis Concrete of Delaware, Inc.,
Del.Supr., 355 A.2d 883 (1976); Restaurants, Inc. v. City of Wilmington,
Del.Supr., 274 A.2d 137 (1971); City of Thi-bodaux, supra at 662. In such cases
fair market value, the traditional measure of condemnation damages, is
extremely difficult to establish since evidence of similar sales in the area is
nonexistent, but where "it is the •.isiness tfsplf uhlcb u se4Md y U must be
valued in the only way businesses can be value*, ke-. according to its ability,
to produce jjoxoje." city of Thlbadaux, supra at 667. In the case at bar
Deimarva is entitled to compensation for the value of the property taken,
which includes the loss of business resulting from a partial taking of its
franchise rights, as well as severance damages. See Orgal, Valuation Under
Eminent Domain 8 223 (1953). Compensation for the loss of business entitles
Deimarva to present evidence of going concern value of the part of the
business taken by Newark, City of Thlbadaux, supra at 667. Deimarva's severance
damage claim permits it to present evidence of the damage to the remainder of
its franchise by virtue of the taking. 0.089 of an Acre of Land in New Castle
Hundred, New Castle County v. State, Del. Supr., 145 A.2d 76 (1958); Board of
Education of Claynont Special School District v. 13 Acres of Land in Brandywine
Huundred, Del. Super., 131 A.2d 180 (1957). Finally, Deimarva may present
evidence of the loss of franchise growth, since at the time its predecessor
company was granted a franchise in 1924, that grant was not made subject to an
overriding power of eminent domain of a municipality or other entity. See City
of Thlbodaux, supra (5th Clr.) at 874.
7) Pursuant to the foregoing, Newark's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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